Decoy state protocols have recently been proposed as an innovative approach to improve dramatically the performance of quantum key distribution systems. Here, we present the first experimental demonstration of decoy state quantum key distribution, over 15km of Telecom fibers.
A key question is: How can one increase the key generation rates and distances of unconditionally secure QKD? A brute force solution to the problem is to develop single photon sources, which is a subject of much recent interest [12] . However, such a brute force approach clearly takes a lot of experimental research efforts. It came as a big surprise that a simple solution-the decoy state method-to the problem actually exists. Such a simple solution is based on better theory, rather than better experiments. The decoy state method allows us to kill two birds with a single stone-a) to achieve unconditional security based on quantum mechanics and b) to improve dramatically the performance of QKD systems. As clearly demonstrated in the present paper, in contrast to single photon sources, decoy state QKD can be implemented with only current technology.
The decoy method is firstly proposed by Hwang [13] , and made rigorous by us [14, 15] and also Wang [16] . Decoy state QKD has attracted much recent interest. See also [17] . Let us recapitulate the basic ideas of decoy state QKD. We assume that Alice can prepare phase-randomized coherent states and can change the intensity of each signal independently and randomly. The weak coherent state emitted by Alice can be denoted by | √ µe iθ >. If the phase θ is totally randomized, the signal state becomes a mixture of photon number eigenstates and the number of photons per signal follows a Poisson distribution. That is, the probability of emitting n photons is p n = e −µ µ n /n!. In addition to the signal state with average photon number µ, in the decoy state idea, one introduces some "decoy" states with some other average photon numbers ν i and mixes up signal states with decoy states randomly. Since one assumes all characteristics (except photon number distribution) of the signal state and the decoy state are the same, Eve's eavesdropping attack can depend on the actual photon number in each state, but nothing else. Computing the number of detection events and error rates of each state, one can effectively detect eavesdropping attacks and therefore achieve a rather high unconditionally secure key generation rate.
In [14] , combining the idea of security proofs using the entanglement distillation approach in GLLP [10] with decoy method, we gave a formula for the key generation rate
where q depends on the protocol, the subscript µ is the average photon number per signal in signal states, Q µ is the gain of signal states, E µ is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of signal states, Q 1 is the gain of the single photon states in signal states, e 1 is the error rate of single photon states.
f (x) is the bi-directional error correction rate (see, for example, [18] ), and H 2 (x) is binary Shannon information function:
Our implementation is based on BB84 [1] protocol. Among total N pulses sent in experiment, N S pulses are used as signal states. Therefore the factor q is given by q = 1 2 N S /N . Q µ and E µ can be measured directly from experiments. In [15] , we have proposed a practical protocol with only one decoy state with average photon number ν. Such a protocol is relatively simple to implement. The gain of weak decoy state Q ν and its error rate E ν could also be acquired directly from experiments. Considering statistical fluctuations, the lower bounds of Y 1 1 and Q 1 , and the upper bound of e 1 are given by [15] 
in which
and therefore the lower bound of key generation rate is
In the later calculations, we give a very conservative estimate with 10 standard deviations (i.e., u α = 10), which promises a confidence interval for statistical fluctuations of 1 − 1.5 × 10 −23 .
Our Experiment
In this paper, we present the first experimental implementation of decoy state QKD. Before we describe our experiment, we would like to point out that the decoy protocol is much easier to implement with a uni-directional QKD system as [4] , [19] , and [20] , because one can modulate the intensity of each laser pulse inside the laser directly. However, we emphasize that the same modulation strategy fails miserably for a bi-directional ("Plug and Play") QKD system where a strong pulse is sent from Bob to Alice, who attenuates it to single photon level and modulates it before sending it back to Bob. This is because, if one were to modulate the intensity inside Bob's laser in a bi-directional system, the eavesdropper can detect the intensities of strong laser pulses from Bob to Alice using standard powermeters, thus breaking security.
Unfortunately, existing commercial QKD systems are bi-directional. To show conceptually how simple it is to apply the decoy state idea to a commercial QKD system, we chose ID-500 commercial Quantum Key Distribution system manufactured by id Quantique [6] . The intrinsic parameters of this "Plug & Play" QKD system is listed in Table 1 .
We remark that, strictly speaking, existing security proofs [10] for imperfect devices apply only to a polarization-based QKD system. In what follows, we will take the assumption that those existing security proofs will carry over directly to a bi-directional QKD system. This assumption is commonly made in the community and appears to be necessary at the moment, if we are to discuss the security of commercial bi-directional QKD system. Further investigations will explore the validity of this assumption.
Another assumption that we will make is that the phase of the laser is indeed random. Therefore, it is valid to consider the signal or decoy state as classical mixtures of photon number eigenstates, rather than their superpositions. As noted in a recent paper [21] , this assumption is crucial in some parameter regions. Table 1 : Intrinsic parameters of ID-500 commercial QKD system as given in its specifications data sheet.
Modulo the above two assumptions, our experiment satisfies the requirement of unconditional security [15] against the most general attack allowed by quantum mechanics. It also gives a rather high key generation rate.
The prototype of this QKD system is described in section 2 of [22] . Here we describe it briefly:
a frame of N P pulses (in our experiment, N P = 624) is generated from Bob and sent to Alice.
Within a frame, the time interval between signals is 200ns. The next frame will not be generated until the whole frame has returned to Bob. The long delay line inside Jr. Alice promises that the incoming signal and returning signal will not overlap in the channel between Bob and Jr. Alice so as to avoid Rayleigh Scattering. It will take roughly 0.4ms to complete a frame for 15km fiber.
Considering time spent to load data from computer, the efficiency of our QKD system is about 2.3s
per megabit.
To implement the one decoy state protocol [15] , we have to attenuate each signal to the intensity of either signal state or decoy state randomly. In our implementation, the attenuation is done by placing a VOA (variable optical attenuator) in Alice's side. Specifically, our QKD system requires the polarizations of the two pulses from the same signal to be orthogonal. Therefore the VOA must be polarization independent so as to attenuate the two pulses equally. The VOA utilized in our experiment to attenuate signals dynamically is Brimrose AMM-100-20-25-1550-2FP AcoustoOptic Modulator (AOM), whose maximum attenuation is -50dB and maximum working frequency is 20MHz. It is driven by Brimrose FFA-100-B1/B2(20)-F0.8 fixed frequency RF Driver whose output frequency is 100MHz. We call this AOM the "Decoy AOM".
The transmittance of the AOM is determined by the modulation voltage (0V∼1V) applied on its driver, which is controlled by Agilent 88250A Function/Arbitary Waveform Generator at 5MHz.
The output of generator is triggered by the synchronization signal from the classical detector in Alice's side. We call this functional generator the "Decoy Generator".
The Decoy AOM, although polarization-independent, introduces a frequency shift of the laser due to Doppler effect from its intrinsic 100MHz acoustic frequency. This frequency shift causes a significant phase shift in unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer in Bob's side when the signal is going back, increasing the QBER to around 90%. To compensate this frequency shift, we Here we would like to emphasize that if we had a variable frequency driver for Decoy AOM (which is also available in Brimrose Corp.), the Compensating AOM and Compensating Generator would not be necessary any more, and our set-up would be even simpler.
Prior to the experiment, we have measured Y 0 , e detector and the total transmittance η. According to these data and the fact that the data size in our experiment is 100M bits, through numerical simulation we could find out the optimal parameters. We set the parameters in our experiment to their optimal values, as shown in Table 2 .
According to the percentages of signal states and decoy states, the exact distribution of the states is given by id Quantique Quantis-PCI-1 Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG), which promised the choice of signal states and decoy states within each frame is truly random: we generated a sequence of 624 integers {1 ≤ n i ≤ 100}, if n i ≤ 88, the i th position will be assigned as signal state, otherwise decoy state. Among total 624 positions, 67 positions are assigned as decoy states, while the rest are assigned as signal states. We call this particular choice of a sequence of 624 pulses within each frame the "Decoy Profile". This Decoy Profile is generated before the experiment and loaded from computer to the Decoy Generator as an "Arbitary Waveform". In principle, for perfect security, a new Decoy Profile should be chosen for each frame. This will require fast electronics for data input. For ease of demonstration, here we apply the same decoy profile for every frame. Note, however, that each signal within a frame is still attenuated individually. Therefore, in our opinion, our experiment addresses most essential technical challenges in the modification of the optical layer of a commercial QKD system for a decoy state implementation. A section of the Decoy Profile is visualized in Figure 1 . Figure 2 illustrates the schematic of the optical and electric layouts in our system. The commercial QKD system by id Quantique consists of Bob and "Jr. Alice". In our decoy state experiment, the actual (sender's) system is called "Alice". It consists of "Jr. Alice" and four new optical and electronics components added by us. A vivid photo of the who system except the controlling computer is shown in Figure 3 .
More concretely, for our decoy state protocol, we place the Decoy AOM (denoted by DA in Fig. 2) right in front of Jr. Alice. Its "idle state" is set to maximum transmittance. When the frame comes from Bob, the Decoy AOM is in the idle state. After the first pulse reaches coupler C 2 , it will be detected by the classical detector and a synchronization signal will be output to trigger the ¡ ¡ ¡ can also see the two pulses from the same signal. However, in the actual experiment, we set things up such that the intensity of the output from the AMO is at single photon level. The data in the chart were acquired by a LeCroy Wavepro7200 2GHz Oscilloscope.
Decoy Generator. The Decoy Generator (DG in Fig.2 ), being triggered, will hold a delay time t Within a frame, the time interval between signals is 200ns, while the time interval between the two pulses of the same signal is 50ns. To keep high visibility, these two pulses of the same signal must be applied the same attenuation, which is probably different from the attenuation applied on the next signal. Considering the rising time and the "jitter time", t d must be very precisely calibrated to make sure both pulses of the same signal are in the "platform" of the attenuation corresponds to this signal. In our experiment, t d = 123.51 µs with an accuracy of 10ns.
After the transmission of the total N pulses, Alice and Bob could share the Decoy Profile, according to which Bob could extract Q µ , Q ν and E µ .
As we have mentioned, the data size we used in the experiment is 100M bits. The total transmission time of these 100M bits was less than 4 minutes. However, we had to calibrate the attenuation of the AOM, the distance between Alice and Bob, and the delay time t d from time to time. We also had to measure the intrinsic characteristics like η prior to the experiment to achieve the optimal pre-set parameters. The whole experiment took us roughly 3 hours.
Results and Discussion
The experimental results are shown in Table 3 .
Value 1.393 × 10 −2 2.100 × 10 −3 9.479 × 10 −3 2.689 × 10 −2 0.4463 1.22 Table 3 : Direct results from our experiment.
With the data in Table 3 , we could calculate the bounds of Y 1 , Q 1 , e 1 and R through Eqs. (2), (3), and (4), as shown in Table 4 . We could see that we have achieved a pretty high key generation rate 5 × 10 −4 at 15km. The finite size of data (100M) gives a final secure key 50k bits and introduces statistical fluctuations and therefore reduces the key generation rate (per pulse) below the fundamental limit of R perf ect , which corresponds to infinite data size and infinite decoy state protocol. We remark that, as discussed in [15] , here we consider only the fluctuations of the parameters, 20MHz and performance of our system can be substantially improved.
Just to emphasize the importance of the decoy method, let us see what will happen if we do not use decoy states. In the absence of decoy states, the key generation rate is given by [10] R ≥ max 0,
where [10] 
Now, from the model in [15] we could estimate by
with data in Table 2 . We performed numerical simulation ranging µ from 0 to 1, while no positive lower bound on R can be found. This fact indicates that for our set-up, at a distance of 15km, without decoy states, we would have been unable to prove the security of our protocol in an analogous manner. [We remark that using the idea of advantage distillation, it is known [23] that BB84 can achieve unconditional security even at QBER as high as 18.9 percent.]
We conclude with a discussion of some problems and future work on the subject. We have measured the fluctuation of the output from the Decoy AOM. As expected, the fractional fluctuation for the decoy state (∼ ±0.1dB) is (naturally) higher than that of the signal state (∼ ±0.01dB). In fact, the visibility of decoy states is lower than that of signal states. Put it another way, there are imperfections ("Trojan Ponies") in both the signal and the decoy states. In principle, Eve might exploit such imperfections to gain more information about the final key than what is otherwise allowed. In future, it will be interesting to study both theoretically and experimentally this type of imperfections in QKD. This is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper. paper, we provide the first experimental demonstration of decoy state QKD over 15km of Telecom fibers. Our result shows that, with rather simple modifications (by adding commercial variable optical attenuators) to a commercial QKD system, decoy state QKD allows us to achieve much better performance (in terms of substantially higher key generation rate and longer distance) than what is otherwise possible. Modulo two technical assumptions discussed earlier, our experiment gives unconditional security against the most general attack allowed by quantum mechanics. Moreover, it gives a rather high key generation rate. We expect that decoy state QKD will play a major role in future QKD systems in both fibers and open air. A new chapter in the real-life arms race between quantum code-makers and quantum code-breakers has just begun.
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